Are parties domocratizing themselves? the evolution of leardership selection in Spain (1977-2008) by Barberà i Aresté, Òscar, et al.
W 
WORKING  
PAPERS 
 
285 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are parties democratizing themselves? 
The evolution of leadership selection in Spain  
(1977-2008) 
 
 
 
 
OSCAR BARBERÀ 
MONTSERRAT BARAS 
ASTRID BARRIO 
JUAN RODRÍGUEZ TERUEL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Are parties democratizing themselves? 
The evolution of leadership selection in Spain (1977-2008) 
 
OSCAR BARBERÀ 
Universitat de València 
 
MONTSERRAT BARAS 
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona 
 
ASTRID BARRIO 
Universitat de València 
 
JUAN RODRÍGUEZ TERUEL 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WP núm. 284 
Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials 
Barcelona, 2010 
  
 
El Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) es un consorcio creado en 1988 por la 
Diputación de Barcelona y la Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, institución esta última a la que 
está adscrito a efectos académicos. 
 
“Working Papers” es una de las colecciones que edita el ICPS, previo informe del 
correspondiente Comité de Lectura, especializada en la publicación –en la lengua original del 
autor– de trabajos en elaboración de investigadores sociales, con el objetivo de facilitar su 
discusión científica. 
 
Su inclusión en esta colección no limita su posterior publicación por el autor, que mantiene la 
integridad de sus derechos. 
 
Este trabajo no puede ser reproducido sin el permiso del autor. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edición: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) 
 Mallorca, 244, pral. 08008 Barcelona (España) 
 http://www.icps.cat 
©   
 
ISSN: 1133-8962 
 
Barberà; Baras; Barrio; Rodríguez Are parties democratizing themselves?... 
ICPS, Working Paper 285 
 
3 
INTRODUCTION* 
The relationship between democracy and political parties has been, since their emergence in 
the mid XIX century, a controversial issue: Political parties are indeed a key institution in 
representative government and, yet, they have not always showed the due respect to the internal 
democratic procedures. This contradiction has fuelled a debate were various issues where 
intermingled: On one side, the question initially raised by Michels (1919), whether the internal 
democracy in parties (whatever the meaning of the concept) is possible or not; On the other, the 
normative discussion on its benefits or risks; Finally, the problem of defining and measuring the 
concept, which has attracted less scholar attention. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the last of these debates. Following Schattsneider’s 
motto (1942) that, the one who controls the selection procedures is the owner of the party, this 
research will focus on what many authors consider the crucial point in the discussion on the 
internal democracy in political parties. Using the Spanish case as the unit of analysis, the goal of 
the research will point out whether there has been a democratization of the leadership selection 
processes in the main Spanish political parties between 1977 and 2008. To assess that, the paper 
will focus on four main dimensions of leadership selection, and will also try to use the evidence 
from the Spanish case as a way to suggest some hypothetic links between them. 
APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF OLIGARCHY AND INTERNAL PARTY 
DEMOCRACY  
The first seminal studies on political parties, according to the traditional suspicion aroused by 
the subject, intended to show the hidden realities within these organizations making special 
emphasis on its lack of internal democracy. This was one of the main conclusions pointed out by 
many of the first academic studies on political parties since the 1950s (Macy, 1904, Ostrogorsky, 
1906, Michels, 1919, Weber, 1919; Duverger, 1957; Mackenzie, 1956). The study that analyzed 
more thoroughly the strategies and psychological mechanisms used by partisan elites to subvert 
democratic procedures and remain in power was the classic work of Michels on the SPD (then 
considered the archetype of modern party). With the motto “who says organization, says oligarchy” 
(Michels, 1919), this author summarized his pessimism regarding the prospect of democracy within 
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the parties. That is probably why the main political theorists of representative government of post-
WW II relayed on the idea that democracy had to be found in the competition between parties, not 
within them (Schattschneider, 1942; Schumpeter, 1950; Dahl, 1956).  
The progresses made with the constitutionalization of western political parties after WW II 
favoured a substantial change in the observation of intra-party rules and democratic procedures 
(García Pelayo, 1986; Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2001). Most constitutions established from then on 
some formal requirements about their internal democracy. These demands were reflected mainly in 
the leadership and candidate selection processes and probably less in the policy process. Although 
the closer scrutiny from the state bureaucracy did not end with the tendency of the elites to want to 
be in power, it served at least to eradicate the totalitarian parties from the western world. The best 
example of that is the transformation of many communist parties into specialized mass parties 
(Duverger, 1957).  
The social changes and transformations experienced by political parties from the 1940s to 
1960s led to a change of approach in their study. Without denying the critical role of the elites, their 
strategies now appeared seriously restricted or conditioned by the new democratic rights held by 
their members. This was due to the transformation of the mass parties and the emergence of the 
catch-all parties (in its various forms) (Kirchheimer, 1969). In both party types the growing formal 
influence of party members began to show the tensions and contradictions between the interests 
and views of members and voters (many of which no longer belonged to the same social milieu) 
(Caul Kittilson and Scarrow, 2006). Those differences were theorized, among others, by John May 
(1973) through his law of curvilinear disparity. May’s law stated that leaders tended to moderate 
their approaches to get closer to the voters, whilst members were more (radical) ideologically 
driven. In these circumstances, members were seen by many politicians and academics as a 
serious obstacle to modernize the party organization or moderate their party manifestos 
(Kirchheimer, 1966; Epstein, 1980; Panebianco, 1988). 
This approach was challenged during the 1980s. The significant organizational 
transformations (profesionalization, candidate-centered elections, the new role of the mass media, 
etc.), driven by many of the main western political parties pointed out towards a new reality: the 
changes in party members´ functions (Norris, 1995a; Scarrow, 1996). That tended to be linked, 
moreover, with the growing crisis of party identification and party membership (Dalton, et. alt. 1984; 
Klingeman and Fuchs, 1995; Scarrow, 2000; Mair and Van Biezen, 2001). All those concerns 
speeded up the debate of whether political parties were failing or in the process of disappearing 
(Lawson and Merckl, 1988). To some members of the academy, the increasing capital-intensive 
orientation of party campaigns and the losses of party members were part of the same vicious 
circle. That is the reason why some scholars discussed about the possible existence of parties 
without members (Dalton and Wattemberg, 2000).  
More recently, the research has shown the variety of strategies used by the boards of the 
parties to adapt to these new conditions. These strategies have been characterized by the growing 
financial needs of the parties and by the small weight of party members in their overall economic 
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support. The main arrangement has been, indeed, the increasing dependence of parties on public 
finances. In some cases, the blurred distinction between state and civil society has lead to some 
forms of cartelisation (Katz y Mair, 1992, 1995; Van Biezen, 2007). From time to time, public 
resources have not only been employed to finance electoral campaigns, but to increase the 
numbers of members by using patronage (Bolleyer, 2008). In other cases, political parties have 
decided to fuse themselves with big firms developing organisational forms between a corporation 
and a political party (Hopkin y Paolucci, 1999). In turn, some examples of oligarchic funding have 
been found through the modern cadre parties (Koole, 1994). Despite all this, political parties have 
tried to maintain and increase their members by giving them more formal power in the leadership 
and candidate selection, as well as in the policy process and the elaboration of party manifestos. 
However, it is not clear yet whether this new empowerment of party members is more rhetorical 
than real: While some of the scholars have maintained its existence (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell, 
2002; Caul-Kittilson and Scarrow, 2006), others have played it down and linked it as a new sign of 
the growing stratarchy produced by the cartelization (Bolleyer, 2008). 
LEADERSHIP SELECTION AND INTRA-PARTY DEMOCRACY: CONCEPTUAL 
AND METHODOLOGICAL REMARKS TO THE SPANISH CASE 
Before referring to the role that members may have in the leadership selection processes 
must be defined, first, who is the party leader. Even ignoring the old distinction between real 
leaders and formal leaders (Duverger, 1957), it is difficult to establish a general definition of a 
leader because of the particularities of each party and every political system. Much of the Anglo-
Saxon tradition tends to identify the party leader with the person who would become prime minister 
if the party came to hold that position in a future government (Gallagher, Laver, Mair, 2001: 282). In 
practice, the party leader tends to be identified with the electoral leader (Davies, 1998; Scarrow, 
Webb, Farrell, 2000; LeDuc, 2001; Caula-Kittilson and Scarrow, 2006). This is because many of 
the Anglo-Saxon parties have a specific procedure to select the electoral leader, which in many 
cases is the only politically relevant mechanism. This circumstance makes the electoral leader the 
leader of the organization and, when they are not the same, the latter is a clearly subordinate to the 
first1.  
However, in most of the Spanish parties there is not a politically important procedure for 
selecting the electoral leader2. In fact, it is the leader of the organization who usually is proclaimed 
as the electoral leader, becoming indeed, the party leader. In the case of the State Wide Parties, 
the main electoral leader is the candidate to become prime minister. For the Non State Wide 
                                                     
1 Duverger (1957) used a similar distinction when referring to the inside leader (the leader of the organization, 
i.e., the party chair-person, the secretary general, etc.) and the outside leader (the electoral leader). 
2
 This does not mean that there is not any kind of formal procedure for electing the electoral leader. However, 
this procedure has not had (in most cases) the character of a real choice, but just a proclamation for electoral 
purposes.   
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Parties, the electoral leader tends to be the candidate to become the regional prime minister, not 
the national one. For this reason, the relevant procedures in the Spanish case are those to select 
the leader of the organization defined as the highest individual executive position in the party. 
However, there are two significant exceptions to this rule. On one side, there are those parties 
whose leader of the organization is not the electoral leader, which leads to a two-man leadership 
that can, sometimes, led to intra-party conflicts3. On the other, there are those parties being 
members of party alliances. In those cases tends to be a procedure to select the leader of the 
alliance, although the tendency is to elect as the electoral leader the one of the major party within 
the alliance4. 
In this paper we are going to analyse the four main dimensions of the leadership selection 
process: the certification process, the voting procedures, the inclusiveness of the selectorate, the 
degree of participation, and, finally the competitiveness of the contests (Table 1). First, we are 
going to examine the certification process, which defines who is eligible for the post (Norris, 2006: 
90). The key point to guide the analysis of this dimension will be whether these procedures have 
evolved over time and to what sense. That is to say, if they have evolved towards more restrictive 
or permissive requirements to become the party leader.   
Second, we are going to analyze the general characteristics of the voting procedure and, in 
particular, whether the party is elected with the whole board of the party or not. In the first case, we 
are going to distinguish whether the list is open or closed (and blocked or not). We will also 
examine whether the votes are by all the party delegates or by territorial delegations. Voting 
procedures are important because this is the divide between an authentic voting system and an 
appointment system (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 113). Be the election of the party leader and the 
board of the party separated (or with open lists) then it could be expected a more open and 
competitive leadership selection.       
In third place, we are going to focus on the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate 
(Scarrow, Webb, Farrell, 2000; LeDuc, 2001; Caul Kittilson and Scarrow 2006). To asses that we 
are going to use a combination of categories developed by LeDuc (2001: 325), and Scarrow, 
Webb, Farrell (2000: 153). In particular, we will make the distinction (from less to more democratic) 
between the following selectorates: the National Committee5, the parliamentary party, the party 
congress, closed primaries (where only members can vote), and primaries open to sympathizers. 
In this dimension, the question to discuss is whether the electorate that chooses the party 
leadership in Spanish has moved towards a more inclusive trend.  
                                                     
3
 The most important case is the PNV where the leader of the organization has almost never been the 
electoral leader. In other parties this has happened during some periods of crisis: the PP in 1989, the PSOE 
between 1998 and 1999, IU between 1999 and 2000 and from 2008.   
4 There are two cases: IU (with the important exception of the period of Gaspar Llamazares, as the leader of 
IU, but not of the leader of the PCE) and CiU, the party alliance between CDC and UDC.  
5 Here we include both the board of the party (the executive branch) and the national committee (the 
representative branch) as the major bodies operating between party congresses.  
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Finally, the article is going to consider the political consequences of the leadership selection 
and, basically, its impact on the competitiveness (Hazan and Rahat, 2006: 115). A good indicator 
of this dimension is the number of candidates competing for the highest individual executive 
position in each election. Be the internal elections contested, another indicator then may be the 
vote share of the winner. Again, we are going to assume that the greater the numbers of contested 
elections, the higher the level of internal democracy.  
The four dimensions are summarized in Table 1. The paper will also use the findings of the 
Spanish case to establish whether it can be established some links between these four 
dimensions. We are going to focus, mainly, on the impact of the certification process, the voting 
procedures and the selectorate (or some combination of them) on the competitiveness. Insofar the 
certification process could restrict the pole of possible candidates it can be hypothesised that the 
restrictions of the certification could have an impact on the degree of competitiveness. At its 
extreme, very restrictive procedures of certification can severely constrain intra-party competition. 
Similarly, the degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate may also be linked to the competitiveness 
in the sense that some party bodies can restrict the competition more than others. Finally, we can 
state that the more open may be the voting procedures, the more contested could be the internal 
ballots.  
 
Table 1 
The four dimensions of the leadership selection used in this study 
Level Certification Selectorate Voting procedures Competitiveness 
     - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    + 
Being member of the 
board of the party 
 
Support from other 
party members 
 
Membership seniority 
 
All members without 
special requirements 
Parliamentary party 
 
National committee 
Congress 
 
Closed primaries 
 
Open primaries 
Election of the whole 
board of the party 
with closed lists 
 
Open lists 
 
Separated election of 
the party leader and 
the rest of the board 
One candidate 
 
Two candidates 
 
More candidates 
Source: author’s own 
 
The following pages will use these four dimensions to examine the trends in the leadership 
selection processes of the five major political parties in Spain: The Partido Socialista Obrero 
Español (PSOE), Alianza Popular / Partido Popular (AP / PP), Izquierda Unida (IU), Convergència 
Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC) and the Partido Nacionalista Basco (PNV). To study the 
certification process and measure the inclusiveness of the selectorate, we are going to examine 
various statutes of each party at different points in time: the case of the PSOE in the statutes of 
1977, 1988, 1997 and 2008; the PP in the 1977, 1990, 2004 and 2008; IU in the 1986, 1996 and 
2004; CDC in the 1977, 1987, 1997 and 2008; and the PNV in the 1977, 1985, 1987, 2000 and 
2008. For the last two dimensions we use data (obtained through the press and official sources of 
the party) of the attendants and the electoral results of the different party congresses held in Spain 
between 1977 and 2008. 
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The certification process  
The certification process of most political parties in Spain is somewhat restrictive. Some 
general requirements are established in all parties: being a member of the party or keeping 
updated their financial obligations. However, beyond these common elements, each party has 
tended to establish additional requirements, being the most common one the seniority rule (having 
an uninterrupted period of membership before the nomination)6. There are also other additional 
requirements that can restrict the possibilities of the general members to the leadership. 
Throughout almost 30 years the PSOE has remained with the same eligibility terms for the 
appointment of the secretary general. Formally, from 1977 there were low restrictive requirements 
in order to be eligible, for the position only required a period of at least 24 months of continuous 
membership prior to nomination. However, in 2004 the requirement of seniority membership 
disappears. In exchange it is required the support of 25 % of the congress delegates, which is a 
clear tightening of the eligibility conditions. Furthermore, it should be noted that there are no limits 
to the number of mandates or to the time that someone can hold the post of general secretary, and 
that there is not any incompatibility rule between the position of secretary general and the exercise 
of public office7.  
AP/PP has experienced several changes throughout its history in the eligibility terms of the 
party leader. This was first the secretary general and later the president). These changes have 
been linked to the general transformation of the organization. In 1977, the party leader (then the 
secretary general) had to be a party member and part of the board of the party (Junta Directiva 
Nacional). From the III Congress (1979), Fraga left the general secretary to become president, 
moving the leadership of the organization to that post. From 1990, after remaking the party and its 
transformation into PP, the post of party leader belongs again to the party president (Chadel, 
2000). In 2004, it is introduced the distinction between different types of party members: activists 
and supporters. Both are considered members, but only the first ones enjoy the right to vote and to 
be eligible to the internal organs and be designated as congress delegates. As in the case of the 
PSOE, the PP statutes have never stated limits to the time that someone can occupy the post of 
president. Nor the party presidency has been incompatible with having a public office. Despite 
changes in the eligibility terms, we cannot consider that AP / PP has evolved towards less 
restrictive procedures. From 1979 it is formally easy to apply for the post of party president.  
To be appointed secretary general of the Partido Comunista de España (PCE), it was 
traditionally required to be part of the Central Committee, a highly restrictive eligibility condition8. 
                                                     
6
 We don’t consider here informal requirements not included in the party statues, or included in internal 
regulations as, for example, the non written criterion that leader must be member of parliament.  
7
 However, as stressed by Méndez (2000: 126) the incompatibilities were very high for the other members of 
the board of the party.  
8 The PCE has adopted in recent years less restrictive mechanisms. Its secretary general is now directly 
elected by the party congress. 
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Instead, in the Izquierda Unida, the organization where the PCE is incorporated since 1986, the 
certification process cannot be considered so restrictive. From the beginning, the coordinador 
general (secretary general) is proposed by those members of the Consejo Político Federal 
(National Committee) chosen by the General Assembly. Unlike the PCE, it is not explicitly required 
in IU that the leader should be part of this body. This system has been maintained since the 
establishment of IU up to the present. In 1994 it was stated that when it cannot be possible to 
reach a consensus on a single candidacy, each candidacy in dispute would require the backing of 
the 10% of those attending the meeting. Unlike the PP and PSOE, in IU it has been stated from 
1994 on, a two-term limit for holding the party leadership. Exceptionally, a mandate may be 
extended if 60% of the Federal Political Council agrees on it. However, there is no incompatibility 
between holding internal positions and public office, although it is noted that it should be desirable 
not to combine both positions. Thus, although the requirements have been changing, it is not 
possible to consider that IU has evolved towards more permissive terms of eligibility. 
CDC stated in its 1977 party constitution that any member could be eligible for the highest 
post of the party, the general secretary. The nomination had to be endorsed by 10 members, while 
any member could support as many candidates as they desired. The party leader had to be elected 
by the party congress among the competing candidates. However, if there was only one candidate, 
the post will be decided automatically (without a ballot). The 1985 party constitution made the 
eligibility requirements become more restrictive, since it required 6 months member seniority and 
the backing of 25 members to compete as a candidate for the party leadership. In the 1995 party 
constitution, this condition was enlarged up to a year, a criterion that has remained unchanged 
since then. Furthermore, the 2008 party constitution added the need for an endorsement of 5% of 
party congress delegates to compete for the leadership. The party constitutions of CDC have not 
set any limits on the duration or incompatibility of the top leaders (president and general secretary). 
Some limits have been set up for other positions that currently cannot be held more than 8 years, 
although the national council can make some exceptions. As in other parties, we cannot conclude 
that CDC is evolving towards more permissive clauses, quite the contrary.  
In the case of the PNV, the two main requirements for becoming the president of the Euskadi 
Buru Batzar (EBB, the board of the party) were being both a member of the party, and holding a 
position in the EBB9. The 1987 party constitution removed the last clause, allowing presidents from 
outside the board of the party. However, in the 2000 party constitution a new eligibility clause was 
added stating the obligation to speak Basque as an eligibility term to the party leadership. This is, 
indeed, a highly restrictive eligibility condition10. Furthermore, the position of president of the PNV 
                                                     
9
 This body was composed by twelve members, three representatives from each one of the four regional 
(provincial) boards of the party (Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava and Navarre). The equitable representation of the 
four provinces, and the fact that belonging to the EBB was linked to the previous presence to the regional 
(provincial) boards of the party, made the party leadership strongly dependent on the internal dynamics of the 
regional organizations. Furthermore, the incompatibilities between party posts and public office caused a huge 
circulation of the party elites as the party gained the Basque government (Perez-Nievas, 2004 ). 
10
 It was a condition previously stated in some regional (provincial) constitutions of the PNV, and it had been 
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and other internal posts are affected by a scrupulous system of incompatibilities which has been 
tightened over the years. According to this principle, the highest individual executive post of the 
organization (as well as virtually all the other internal ones) cannot be exercised by officials or 
employees of public administration, and it is incompatible with the exercise of public office as well 
as with being the leader of unions or business organizations. For a while some ad hoc exceptions 
could be decided, but this was soon removed. Since 1992, to hold a party position it is required a 
membership seniority of two years. In the 2000 party constitution it is stated a 4 years limit for the 
exercise of each executive position, although it is provided that some exceptions can be made. 
Therefore, in the PNV there has been towards a progressive tightening of the eligibility conditions. 
In general terms, it can be concluded that none of the Spanish parties has softened the 
eligibility conditions of their leaders. On the other hand, these requirements have progressively 
been strengthened. However, it may be said that most of them are not highly restrictive clauses, 
except for the PNV in which case the terms to hold the position of party leader are higher than in 
the other organizations. 
The voting procedures 
The voting procedures of the Spanish political parties show some differences due to the fact 
that some of them have separated the election for the leader and the board of the party. On the 
other side, almost all of them have allowed the voting by delegates and not by territories on their 
party congresses.   
Since 1976, the PSOE has always chosen the party leader through party congresses. In all 
cases, the party leader coincided with the leader of the organization, the secretary general11. 
Between 1977 and 2000, the process of leadership selection was based on a ballot with closed 
lists of candidates by the party congress. The lists contained the candidates for the general 
secretary and the other members of the board of the party12. This has changed since 2000, when 
the election of the secretary general was divided from the rest of the board of the party. The striking 
feature of the party congresses of the PSOE from 1979 to 1990 was the vote for territorial 
delegations (each territory having one vote), not by party delegates. This left the leadership 
selection process in the hands of the regional and provincial leaders of each delegation (Colomé 
                                                                                                                                                                
working until then as a de facto requirement. To be Basque-speaking (euskaldún) can be considered as a 
highly restrictive condition, since only less than 40% of the population speaks this language (source: Basque 
Statistics Institute). Besides, the party constitution states that Basque is the official language of the party. 
11
 The only exception to this rule happened between 1998 and 1999, when the celebration of closed primary 
elections to select the electoral leader led to a short period of cohabitation between the Secretary General and 
the party candidate for the national prime ministership. 
12
 This procedure constituted an important break with the leadership selection processes of the PSOE during 
the years of the II Republic (Juliá, 1997). The only major exception came in 1981 by a symbolic gesture of the 
President of Andalusia (see note 20). 
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Nieto and Lopez, 1989). This rule changed after 1994, when the board of the party was then 
directly elected by the delegates.  
Though initially the AP party constitution stated that the party leadership had to be chosen by 
the Junta Directiva Nacional (the board of the party), during the I Congress the whole board of the 
party was elected by the party delegates by acclamation (López Nieto, 1988:32). Since then, the 
AP leader has always been chosen by the party congresses. As in the PSOE until 2000, the 
election of the party leader and the rest of the board have been done in the same closed list13. 
However, unlike the PSOE, in the AP and PP congresses the party leader has always been elected 
through the individual vote of the delegates (López Nieto, 1988; Colomé and Lopez Nieto, 1989).  
Since its formation in 1989, IU has chosen the party leader (named coordinator general) 
through an indirect process. The party leader of IU has always been the party’s electoral candidate 
in the general election14. In the tradition of the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) –the main party 
that integrates IU15–, the party assembly elects the board of the party who, along with other co-
opted members elect the party leader. In this sense, IU is one of the Spanish parties where the 
participation of the party membership in the leadership selection has always been more restricted.  
CDC has always selected the highest individual executive position through Congress. The 
organizational leader has always been the electoral leader of the several party alliances in which 
CDC has been involved16. As CDC is a Non State Wide Party, the party leader has always been 
the candidate in the Catalan autonomous elections17. The party leader of CDC has been elected by 
direct vote of the party delegates in a separated ballot from the rest of the board of the party.  
The leadership selection processes of the PNV had traditionally been quite oligarchic. 
Furthermore, the party has long time maintained a rigorous system of incompatibilities whereby the 
organization leader (the president of the EBB, the board of the party) and the electoral leader 
cannot be the same person. At the beginning of the Spanish political transition, the EBB chose the 
party president amongst its members. From 1988 on, the party president became appointed by the 
territorial representatives of the Asamblea Nacional (the highest representative body between party 
assemblies) during the General Assembly.  
                                                     
13
 The only exception was the 1986 congress, when the president’s vote was divided from the rest of the 
board of the party (Verge, 2008: 321).  
14
 The only exception occurred in the 2000 general election, when the general coordinator, Julio Anguita, had 
to resign, due to health, a few months before the election to present a candidate. 
15
 IU was born as an alliance of parties and various social platforms. In 1992 they registered as a federation of 
parties. Despite the changes, the weight of the various parties (especially the PCE) and civil society 
organizations remains critical (Ramiro, 2004: 66 y ss).  
16
 CDC created in 1977 the electoral alliance Pacte Democrátic de Catalunya. From 1979 on CDC has formed 
a party alliance with UDC (Barrio, 2008). 
17
 In the 1977 and 1979 general election, the party leader was the electoral leader because there was not yet 
self-government in Catalonia.   
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The inclusiveness of the selectorate  
Generally speaking, the Spanish political parties choose their leaders through representative 
selectorates (Table 2). Some parties do it from their creation, while others have evolved from 
oligarchic selectorates to representative ones. None of the parties analyzed in this study has 
adopted democratic mechanisms (direct election through primaries) to select their leaders18.  
The PSOE has not changed the inclusiveness of the selectorate to elect the secretary 
general since 1977. The internal body dealing with this task are party congresses. Therefore, it has 
always used a representative system. The number of delegates to the party congress has 
increased over the years because of the growth of the party membership. However, over the years, 
the proportion of members to delegates has raised sharply. In the 1977 party congress the ratio 
was of 66 members to each delegate, while by the 2000 party congress each delegate represented 
410 members19.  
On the contrary, AP/PP has changed the selectorate of its party leader and has evolved from 
an oligarchic system towards a representative system. The party constitution of 1977 specified that 
the secretary general was chosen by the board of the party (Junta Directiva Nacional). In 1979 
some changes were introduced: the president (and not the secretary general) became the party 
leader, and it has to be elected by the party congress. With these changes, AP/PP has introduced 
though a significant transformation in degree of inclusiveness of the selectorate. On the other hand, 
despite the fact that AP party congresses are much more crowded than those of the PSOE, the 
increase of the membership has produced a substantial change of the ratio members/delegates 
from 5 (1979) to 202 (2000)20. 
From its foundation until now, IU party leader is elected by an oligarchic selectorate. The 
coordinator general is chosen by the National Committee originally called Comité Político Federal 
and since 1990 Consejo Político Federal (Ramiro, 2004: 56). The leadership selection is the result 
of a two step procedure. First the party leader is nominated only by those members of the National 
Committee that have been elected by the General Assembly. Then the plenary of the Consejo 
Político Fedral (which includes co-opted members) ratifies that decision. As IU has not changed the 
selectorate, there hasn’t been any increase in its inclusiveness. However, there has been an 
increase in the proportion of members per delegate from 75 (in 1989) to 85 (in 2000), but this 
increase has been lower than in other cases because of the limited increase in membership21.  
CDC has not changed the procedures to select the party leader from 1977 to now. What has 
been changing is the name of the position from secretary general to party president. The 
                                                     
18
 However, there are other examples of parties in Spain that have used closed primaries, as in the case of 
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya and Iniciativa per Catalunya, both Non State Wide Parties. 
19
 In 1977, the PSOE had 48.635 members, and in 2000 had 407.821 (Carreras y Tafunell, 2005: 140) 
20
 In 1979 AP had 5.000 members and in 2000 had 601.731 (Carreras y Tafunell, 2005: 140). 
21
 In 1990 IU had 60.000 members and in 2000 had 67.802 (Carreras y Tafunell, 2005: 140) 
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selectorate has always been the party congress, though. As the other parties, the growth of the 
overall party membership has increased the disparity between party members and delegates in the 
party congresses. The ratio increased from 5 members per delegate in 1977 to 16 in 200022.   
The PNV is the party that has experienced major transformations in the leadership selection 
processes. In the early years of the Spanish political transition the party remained with the very 
model of organization inherited from the 1930s. Those procedures were characterized by a strong 
weight of the regional (provincial) organizations in the power structure of the party (Perez-Nievas, 
2004). By then, the EBB (the board of the party) elected its president amongst its 12 members, 
making the leadership selection remarkably oligarchic. From 1988 on, the mechanism has 
substantially changed. The party leader (the EBB president) has to be proposed by the Euskadi 
Buru Batzar, but only the members of the Asamblea Nacional (National Committee) elected by the 
territorial organizations can vote. The ballot has to take place during the General Assembly23. This 
change has had a great impact on the representativeness of the selectorate. The ratio has 
changed from 2002 members per delegate in 1978, to 408 in 200224. Therefore, during these years 
the PNV has evolved from an oligarchic towards a representative selectorate, a half way between 
IU and the rest. 
 
Table 2 
Inclusiveness of the selectorate. Spain 1977-2008 
 Oligarchic Representative Democratic 
Party National 
Committee 
Parliamentary 
Group Congress 
Closed 
primaries 
Open 
primaries 
IU 1986, 1996, 2004     
PNV * 1977, 1985  19871, 20081   
PP * 1977  1990, 2004   
CDC   1977, 1987, 1997, 2008   
PSOE   1979, 1988, 1997, 2008   
*evolution towards more inclusive procedures between 1977 and 2008. 1In the PNV the party leader is only 
elected by the members of the Asamblea Nacional (National Committee) previously elected by their territorial 
organizations (Not the whole Asamblea Nacional) 
Source: author’s own from LeDuc (2001) and Caul-Kittilson y Scarrow (2006). Data is from party constitutions  
 
As a general remark, it can be said that Spanish political parties have evolved towards more 
inclusive selectorates, as they have gradually given the control of the leadership selection process 
to the party congresses. However, we cannot consider that the degree of democratization has been 
increased significantly since all parties continue to use mechanisms of representative nature. In 
some cases (IU), we can even find some indirect mechanisms that encourage the maintenance of 
                                                     
22
 In 1977 CDC had 2.650 members and in 2000 had 30.000 (Carreras y Tafunell, 2005: 140) 
23
 The General Assembly was created in 1988 and is composed by representatives from each municipal 
organization, representatives of the foreign organizations, representatives of the Asamblea Nacional, 
members of public office at regional and municipal level, etc. On the other hand, the Asamblea Nacional 
(National Committee) is composed by elected representatives of the regional (provincial) organizations as well 
as other co-opted members (other relevant party posistions). The Asamblea Nacional is the highest 
representative body between General Assemblies. 
24
 in 1978 the PNV had 24.030 members while in 2000 had 30.583 (Carreras y Tafunell, 2005: 140). 
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oligarchic connotations in the selection of the leader. On the other hand, the increasing ratio 
members/delegates is due to the fact that the growth of party membership has been greater than 
the selectorate. The main factor of this growing disproportionality has been the maintenance of the 
party congresses as a selectorate. Only the PNV has experienced a more inclusive trend.  
The competitiveness 
The following pages are going to discuss the evolution of party leadership in contemporary 
Spain. We are going to focus on the degree of competitiveness of their leadership selection 
processes. These dimensions will be analyzed with data from several party congresses stressing 
the leadership replacements that have taken place in each party.  
Felipe González was the party leader of the PSOE from the mid-seventies until the mid-
nineties, after being first elected secretary general during the party congress held in Suresnes 
(France) in 1974 (Julià, 1997). Gonzalez saw his leadership challenged in 1979 when the majority 
of the Congress delegates decided, against his criterion, to keep the Marxist ideology in the party 
manifesto (Table 3). Gonzalez’s resignation to the General Secretary opened a period of crisis that 
led to a new party congress, four months later. In that congress an alternative candidate was 
presented by those who wanted to keep the Marxist references on the party manifesto. The victory 
of González (enhanced due to the change of the individual vote by the delegation vote) finally 
ended up consolidating his leadership within the party25. From his victory in the 1982 general 
election to the late nineties González leadership was unchallenged. Despite the internal division 
during the 1990s between the renovadores (renewers, close to Gonzalez) and the guerristas (close 
to the deputy party leader, Alfonso Guerra), there were never any alternative candidacies in the 
party congresses. Furthermore, the disputes between the two sectors did never really challenge 
the leadership of Gonzalez (Méndez, 2000).  
During the 1997 congress, held shortly after losing government, Gonzalez announced his 
retirement from the party leadership. However, this didn’t open up a greater competitiveness for the 
succession. An agreement between the regional leaders (the so called barones) made possible the 
election of Joaquín Almunia, an exminister close to González (Hopkin, 2001). In order to provide 
himself with more legitimacy, Almunia called a closed primary election to elect the PSOE electoral 
candidate to the 2000 general election. In that process party members played a crucial role in 
deciding the candidate. But, contrary to Almunia’ expectations, the victory was for the alternative 
candidate, José Borrell. Borrell’s victory led to a period of cohabitation between the secretary 
general and the electoral candidate. That period ended one year later when Borrell was forced to 
resign by a scandal and, above all, by the disputes within the party leadership. Almunia became 
then the electoral candidate, but the party’s poor performance in the 2000 general election led to 
                                                     
25
 In the 1981 party congress, internal disputes between the board of the PSOE and the President of 
Andalusia led to the latest to submit a solo candidacy for the board of the party (not to post of secretary 
general, though). That candidacy did not prosper. 
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his resignation as secretary general. The consequence was a very open competition at the 
congress of 2000, where contested four candidates. The winner was the most unknown of all of 
them, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero. Despite a tight victory of Zapatero in the 2000 Congress, its 
victory in the 2004 and 2008 general election has consolidated him as the new and unchallenged 
leader of the party.   
 
Table 3 
Competitiveness in party congresses. PSOE 1977-2008 
Year Atten-dees1 Candidates 
Leader 
change Party Leader Post 
Votes 
%2 Type of leader
 
1976 736 1 No F. González SG Nd Others 
1979 1008 - - (managing committee)3 - - - 
1979ex 421 2 No F. González SG 85,9 MP 
1981 765 14 No F. González SG 100 MP 
1984 769 1 No F. González SG 96,1 Prime minister 
1988 862 1 No F. González SG 100* Prime minister 
1990 871 1 No F. González SG 100* Prime minister 
1994 891 1 No F. González SG 89,4 Prime minister 
1997 954 1 Yes J. Almunia SG 72,9 MP 
2000 995 4 Yes J.L.Rodríguez Zapatero SG 41,75 MP 
2004 974 1 No J.L.Rodríguez Zapatero SG 95,6 Prime minister 
2008 995 1 No J.L.Rodríguez Zapatero SG 98,5 Prime minister 
*approximate data. Nd: No data. SG: Secretary General. 1Party delegates. Between 1979 and 1990 votes 
were by territorial delegations. 2Share of votes, not over total attendance. 3A managing committee chaired by 
José Federico Carvajal (president of that congress) was responsible for leading the party until the 
extraordinary congress. 4See note 20. 5In 2000 the PSOE split the vote of the general secretary of the 
executive. The figures are from the first ballot 
Source: author’s compilation from the press 
 
Manuel Fraga has been the main leader of the AP from its formation until the end of the 80s 
(Table 4). Fraga was elected general secretary of the AP in the party congresses of 1977 and 
197926, but he resigned from this post after the 1979 elections. This opened a period of crisis that 
reinforced Fraga’s powers within AP. At the end of that, Fraga was elected president (López Nieto, 
1988). The sub-triumph of AP in the 1982 elections, when AP became the first opposition party, 
favoured the consolidation of Fraga as party leader (Montero, 1989). However, the poor results in 
the 1986 general election led again to his resignation. At the 1987 party congress, two candidates 
disputed his succession. Finally, the winner was Antonio Hernández Mancha who for some time 
became the new president and party leader. Hernández Mancha’s leadership was challenged by 
the poor performance of AP in the local and regional elections of 1987. The internal division lead to 
the comeback of Fraga, who presented his candidacy for the party leadership shortly before the 
1989 party congress. Fraga’s candidacy led to the resignation of Hernández Mancha (Baón, 2001).  
The 1989 party congress gave way to the refoundation of the party, which was renamed 
Partido Popular. Although Fraga returned again as party president, he rejected to be again the 
party electoral leader. Hence, the candidacy of the PP to the 1989 general election was decided 
just few months before the elections, with the designation by Fraga of José María Aznar (then 
                                                     
26
 AP was initially structured as a federation of parties (halfway between a direct party and an indirect party), 
but since 1979 the parties lost their importance (López Nieto, 1988).  
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regional prime minister of Castilla y León). The success of Aznar in the 1989 general election 
favoured his candidacy as a party leader, becoming the new party president in the 1990 congress. 
The victory of the PP in the 1996 general election led the party to the national government for the 
very first time and consolidated Aznar’s leadership. After eight years as Prime Minister, Aznar 
pledged not to opt for a third term and, few months before the 2004 general election, appointed 
Mariano Rajoy (then vice-president of the national government) as his successor and electoral 
candidate. The PP lost the 2004 election, but the tight results and the strong polarization of the 
Spanish political life helped Rajoy to maintain his party leadership. He became thus, the new party 
president at the 2004 party congress. The good performance of the PP in the 2008 general election 
favoured, despite the new electoral defeat, Rajoy’s leadership. Although some dissatisfied 
members tried to endorse an alternative candidate before the 2008 party congress, this attempt 
was finally unsuccessful.      
 
Table 4 
Competitiveness in party congress. AP-PP 1977-2008 
Year Name1 Attendees2 Candidates Leader 
change Party Leader Post Vote %
3 Type of leader 
1977 AP 3000 1 - M. Fraga SG Nd Francoism MP 
1978 AP sd 1 No M. Fraga SG Nd MP 
1979 AP 1000* 1 No M. Fraga PT 92,4 MP 
1981 AP 1800* 1 No M. Fraga PT 98,9 MP 
1982 AP 2500* 1 No M. Fraga PT Nd MP 
1984 AP 2700* 1 No M. Fraga PT 94,7 MP 
1986 AP 2300 1 No M. Fraga PT Nd MP 
1987 AP 2837 2 Yes A. Hernández Mancha PT 71,5 MP (Senate) 
1989 AP/PP 2881 1 Yes M. Fraga PT 85,8 MP 
1990 PP 2850 1 Yes J.M. Aznar PT 96,2 MP 
1993 PP 2900 1 No J.M. Aznar PT 98,4 MP 
1996 PP 2900 1 No J.M. Aznar PT 99,5 MP  
2000 PP 2980 1 No J.M. Aznar PT 98,9 Prime Minister 
2002 PP 3156 1 No J.M. Aznar PT 99,4 Prime Minister 
2004 PP 3028 1 Yes M. Rajoy PT 97,5 MP 
2008 PP 2774 1 No M. Rajoy PT 82,7 MP 
Nd: No data. 1AP from 1977 until 1989, PP since 1990. 2Congress delegates. 3Share of votes, not over total 
attendance 
Source: authors compilation from the press 
 
From its origins, the history of IU was associated to the leadership of Julio Anguita 
(Secretary General of the PCE, as well). Anguita was elected coordinator general and electoral 
candidate in the 1989 General Assembly (Table 5). The good performance of IU during the 1989 
general election consolidated Anguita’s leadership. But in 1991 he resigned because he felt that his 
authority had been undermined by the board of the party27. From 1991 to the 1992 General 
Assembly, the party operated without a coordinator general. In the 1992 General Assembly, the 
disagreements on the conversion of the PCE into IU, and on the party line about the Maastricht EU 
Treaty divided the party in two factions: the ortodoxos (the orthodox, lead by Anguita) and the 
renovadores (the renewers). Anguita imposed his views on that General Assembly. However, the 
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 The problem was the degree of involvement of the PCE within IU (Ramiro, 2004: 125).  
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factionalist fights continued during the previous weeks of the 1997 party assembly. Finally, the 
discrepancies led to the split of the renovadores28. The exit of this faction didn’t put an end to the 
internal turmoil. The 1997 General Assembly was marked by the competition between three 
candidiacies for the party leadership, though Anguita won clearly. Health problems and the poor 
performance in the 1999 election forced the withdrawal of Anguita as candidate some months 
before the 2000 general election.     
The new electoral candidate of IU was Francisco Frutos, secretary general of the PCE. 
Despite a limited electoral alliance with the PSOE29, the results in the 2000 general election were 
very bad, hampering Frutos’ aspirations over party leadership. At the 2000 General Assembly, 
Frutos was defeated by Gaspar Llamazares, the first leader of IU not being at the same time the 
leader of the PCE. The division remained as well as the poor results in the 2004 general election30. 
In 2007, a closed primary election was held to select the party candidate for the 2008 general 
election. Llamazares comfortably defeated the candidate of the PCE, although the turnout was very 
low, below 40% of the census (Table A1). The electoral decrease of IU in the 2008 general election 
left Llamazares in a bad position. Being the only representative of IU that gained a seat in 
parliament, Llamazares was forced to resign as coordinator general of IU. His succession took 
place in the stormy 2008 General Assembly where five candidates contested for the party 
leadership. Finally, Cayo Lara (from the PCE) was elected as the new coordinator general.   
 
Table 5 
Competitiveness in party congresses. IU 1977-2008 
Year Attendees1 Candidates Leader change Party Leader Post % votes2 Type of leader 
1989 Nd 1 - J. Anguita CG Nd Regional MP 
1990 800* 1 No J. Anguita CG 84,7 MP 
1992 Nd 2 No J. Anguita CG 60* MP 
1994 Nd 1 No J. Anguita CG 78,6 MP 
1997 1300* 3 No J. Anguita CG 74,4 MP 
2000 800* 3 Yes G. Llamazares CG 42,6 MP 
2003 750* 3 No G. Llamazares CG 76 MP 
2004 850* 3 No G. Llamazares CG 49,5 MP 
2008 170 5 Yes C. Lara CG 55 Town councillor 
*approximate data from media. Nd: No data. 1Assembly delegates. 2The General Assembly elects the board of 
the party that, in turn, elects the coordinator general. The Share of votes are from the different candidacies in 
the General Assembly, not over total attendance 
Source: compiled by authors from the press 
 
                                                     
28
 They formed the New Left Democratic Left Party, which was integrated at the end in the PSOE in October 
2000. 
29
 The PSOE and IU attempted to form an electoral coalition for the 2000 elections. However, the harsh 
conditions imposed by the PSOE prevented any coalitional pact. The final agreement was on some policy 
specifics and on some sort of mutual support in 27 Senate constituencies (Sánchez-Sierra, 2005). 
30
 Llamazares won the 2004 General Assembly. However, he didn’t achieve the 60% of the votes in the board 
of the party required for a third term re-election. Nevertheless, Llamazares remained as party leader because 
the alternative candidate finally decided not to contest the ballot results (Verge, 2008: 321).  
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The history of CDC has been deeply marked by the leadership of its main founder, Jordi 
Pujol (Table 6). He has always been the electoral leader, first in the 1977 and 1979 general 
election, and from 1980 to 2003 in the Catalan regional elections. Pujol was the president of the 
Generalitat of Catalonia (the Catalan regional government) between 1980 and 2003. In all party 
congresses Pujol recorded a support above 90 percent of the vote, and was never challenged by 
an alternative candidate. In the late 90s, he began to prepare his succession (known as 
postpujolismo) giving way within the party and the regional government to a new generation of 
leaders. Pujol’s dauphin, Artur Mas, was elected in 2000 secretary general of CDC, and in the 2003 
regional elections became CiU’s electoral candidate. Despite the fact that Mas lost the regional 
government in 2003 and 2006 (mainly because of an alliance of all the leftist parties), it has 
remained as CDC’s party leader.  
 
Table 6 
Competitiveness in party congresses. CDC 1977-2008 
Year Attendees1 Candidates Leader change Party Leader Post %votes2 Type of leader 
1977 580 1 No J. Pujol SG -3 Others 
1978 Sd 1 No J. Pujol SG sd MP 
1981 900* 1 No J. Pujol SG 93,9 Regional President 
1985 442* 1 No J. Pujol SG >90* Regional President 
1989 670* 1 No J. Pujol PT 99,7 Regional President 
1992 887* 1 No J. Pujol PT 92,5 Regional President 
1996 1721 1 No J. Pujol PT 94,4 Regional President 
2000 1881 1 Yes A. Mas SG 85,2 Regional President 
2004 1937 1 No A. Mas SG 96 Regional MP 
2008 2028 1 No A. Mas PT 95,2 Regional MP 
*approximate data from media. Sd: No data. 1Party delegates. 2Share of votes, not over total attendance. 
3Pujol was appointed without a ballot 
Source: compiled by authors from the press 
 
Unlike other parties, the first years of the PNV during the post-francoist regime were 
characterized by a high level of instability in the party leadership (Table 7). That led to a split during 
the mid 1980s. At the end of the francoist regime the PNV was a weak and old party. In an effort to 
renew the party leadership Carlos Garaicoetxea (a young politician) was elected in 1977 as the 
new president of EBB (the board of the party). For he failed to obtain a parliamentary seat in the 
1977 general election, Garaicoetxea was not concerned by the incompatibility rule (as happened to 
other party regional leaders of the PNV) and was able to continue as party president (the leader of 
the organization) until 1980, when he became the new Lehendakari (president) of the Basque 
regional government. Xavier Arzalluz replaced Garaicoetxea as the leader of the organization, and 
remained in that post until May 1984. After serving four years, Arzalluz exceeded the time limit that 
had traditionally existed for the executive internal positions31. Arzalluz was substituted by Sudupe 
Román. However, few months later Sudupe lost his seat in the regional board of the party and had 
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 In January 1984, Arzalluz had prompted a reform of the statutes in which annulled the limit of four years. 
But in a context of increasing internal confrontation, he preferred to leave the post to a candidate of his faction, 
rather than providing incentives favouring the candidate promoted by Garaicoetxea. 
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to leave his post in the national board of the party and thus, the party presidency. He was replaced 
in 1985 by Jesús Insausti, regional party leader32. During the Sudupe and Insausti period, an 
increasing confrontation grew up between the electoral leader and president of the government 
(Garaicoetxea) and the board of the party. This division spread geographically, threatening the 
integrity of the party. In this context, in February 1986 Arzalluz became again party president, 
fuelling the confrontation with Garaicoetxea, who finally left the party and created Eusko 
Alkartasuna.  
In 1987, after the party split, the PNV reformed the party constitution and introduced 
important changes to the leadership selection process. On the one hand, the new party constitution 
created the figure of the General Assembly, which would function as a party congress every four 
years. On the other, the president of the EBB would be elected by the territorial representatives of 
the Asamblea Nacional (the National Committee) during the General Assembly. The president’s 
mandate would last four years and its renewal would concur with the celebration of the General 
Assembly. Thus, the new system was representative, although the General Assembly delegates 
didn’t participate in the election (except those of the Asamblea Nacional). Furthermore, the 
Asamblea Nacional would elect the rest of members of the EBB in a separate ballot. The new 
election procedure gave more stability to the central party elites and enhanced the figure of the 
president. That enabled Xavier Arzalluz to be re-elected as president for more than fifteen years. 
His replacement in 2004 was competitive, since two candidates ran for the party leadership. 
Finally, Josu Jon Imaz defeated the candidate supported by Arzalluz by a narrow difference. Imaz’s 
presidency coincided with the presence in the Basque government of the Lehendakari Juan Jose 
Ibarretxe. This one had a more radical political line and was close to Arzalluz. During his term, 
Imaz highlighted his differences with Ibarretxe, which led to a new crisis just before the 2008 party 
congress. Eventually, the resignation of Imaz to be re-elected enabled a candidate of consensus 
between the two factions. Iñigo Urkullu became then new president of the PNV. 
 
Table 7 
Participation and competitiveness in party congresses. PNV 1977-2008 
Year Attendees1 Candidates Leader change Party Leader Post % votes2 Type of leader 
1977 12 1 Yes C. Garaicoetxea PT 100* Party leader 
1980 12 1 Yes X. Arzalluz PT 100* Party leader 
1984 12 1 Yes R. Sudupe PT 91,7 Party leader 
1985 12 1 Yes J. Insausti PT 100* Party leader 
1986 12 1 Yes X. Arzalluz PT 100* Party leader 
1987 12 1 Yes X. Arzalluz PT 100* Party leader 
1988 75 1 No X. Arzalluz PT 100 Party leader 
1992 75 1 No X. Arzalluz PT 100* Party leader 
1995 75 1 No X. Arzalluz PT 100* Party leader 
2000 75 1 No X. Arzalluz PT 100* Party leader 
2004 71 2 Yes J.J. Imaz PT 57’7 Party leader 
2008 75 1 Yes I. Urkullu PT 100 Party leader 
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 Insausti became president of the Biscaya regional board of the party because the expected candidate, 
Michel Unzueta could not speak euskera. 
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*Approximate data from media. Notes: 1. Attendees to the selectorate. 2. Between 1977 and 1987 the party 
president was elected by the board of the party. From 1988 on the party leader is elected by the members of 
the Asamblea Nacional elected by the territories. 3. Share of votes, not over total attendance.  
Source: Compiled by authors from the press 
 
Regarding to the competitiveness, the high continuity in the leadership has been the most 
dominant feature for the Spanish political parties. Overall, the competition has been quite 
exceptional and linked to the withdrawal of the incumbent leader (PSOE in 2000, PP in 1987, PNV 
in 2004, 2000, IU in 2008) or due to internal crisis (POSE in 1979, IU in 1992, 1997 or 2004). Any 
incumbent party leader has been defeated by an alternative leader through internal elections. The 
incumbency is a real advantage to any party leader. The best example of that are the high levels of 
vote share in party congresses, even when the party leader is challenged. IU is the only case 
where the competition between candidates is high, even being the most oligarchical of all Spanish 
parties. The high degree of competition at IU has been, indeed, a reflection of its internal 
factionalism and its electoral decline.  
Conclusions  
Overall, none of the four indicators chosen to analyze the evolution of the selection of party 
leaders tended towards greater opening in Spanish political parties. Firstly, it should be noted that 
although the certification process is not very restrictive, the trend has been to be progressively less 
open. The PNV is the party that has a tougher certification process because of the introduction of 
the Basque-speaking clause to be party president. On the other hand, the electoral procedures 
have been more stable. There are slight differences between parties because some of them have 
separated the election of the leader from the election of the rest of the board of the party. Other 
parties only have one ballot for the whole board of the party with closed lists. In contrast, all the 
Spanish parties (with the important exception of the PSOE between 1979 and 1994) have stated 
individual votes for their party congress delegates. Third, there have been no major changes in the 
inclusiveness of the selectorate. Most parties have maintained throughout this period the party 
congress as the core selectorate for party leaders. The exception to this trend are IU and, until 
1988, the PNV. Forth, though the number of delegates attending the party congresses has grown 
slightly since the late seventies, these figures have not increased in the same proportion as the 
membership. This has taken all parties to declining rates of representativeness in the leadership 
selection. Finally, another common feature of the Spanish political parties is the relatively low level 
of competitiveness in the leadership selection process. However this must be amended according 
to each party. CDC is the only case in which there have never been two candidacies contesting for 
the party leadership. On the other hand, IU has had constant contests between two or more 
candidates. Taken as a whole, the Spanish political parties analyzed in this study did not seem to 
have been inspired by the new wave of party democracy that seems to be spreading in other 
countries.  
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This work also was meant to establish, tentatively, some considerations about the 
relationship between the leadership selection rules and the competitiveness. In general terms, it 
has to be remarked the weak relation between them. The formal opening of the certification criteria 
has not been accompanied, in the Spanish case, with greater competitiveness. Instead, the low 
competitiveness can be linked, to some extent, to the inclusiveness of the selectorate, especially of 
the choice of leader by Congress. That procedure seems to discourage the competition. 
Unsurprisingly, the vote share obtained by all incumbent party leaders in their party congresses 
has always been exceptionally high (with the exception of some internal crisis). However, the 
decline of the representativeness of the party congresses has had the opposite effect of reducing 
the effective participation of the party membership in the leadership selection process.    
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